Indonesian May Revolution

As most parts of the world now are moving toward democratic path, it is interesting to read again Barrington Moore’s work on the origin of democracy and dictatorship. In his book, he explained roles played by the landed upper classes and the peasantry in the transformation from agrarian societies to modern industrial one. He discovered various historical conditions under which both or either rural groups have become important forces behind the emergence of Western parliamentary versions of democracy and dictatorship. His thesis is, to put it shortly, those classes had a role in the bourgeois revolution leading to democracy, in the abortive bourgeois revolutions leading to fascism, and the peasant revolutions leading to communism.[1]

The question is “What is the case in the contemporary world?” There remain, if not many, non-democratic and non-industrial countries in the world. Will we witness the same role played by landed upper class and the peasantry in the contemporary transformation? If not, who play the same important role in the democratic transformation in the contemporary world?

I think it is interesting to study recent democratic transformations to compare them with those Moore studied. Democratic transformations in Philippine and Indonesia, for example, are worth to be studied for their revolutionary nature. The revolutions of “People Power” in Philippine (1986)[2] and “Gerakan Reformasi” (1998)[3] in Indonesia occurred in the different global system than revolutions Moore discussed in his book – in which new global system arose from these very revolutions. Thus, it would be interesting to test his thesis in such contemporary revolutions.

It is my contention that in the contemporary global world, with its interdependency, we can no longer rely on the explanations Barrington Moore gave. His thesis tends to treat revolutions merely as an internal dynamics, rather than inter or transnational dynamics. I find him discussed England and France in isolation. He did not mention such external factors bearing significant influence on the revolution. English Revolution occurred in England and by English. France Revolution occurred in France and by Frenchmen. He did not refer to any external agent play as important role as the internal one did.

Probably, those were the cases in the old world. However, since the 1990s, mainly, it is implausible to understand change in a country merely as a fact isolated in the given country. A transformation from a non-democracy to a democracy is no longer relies merely on social classes struggle. Interdependency among countries is obvious not only in the term of economy, but politics, culture, law, and even every single aspect of our life (food we eats, shoes we use, cloth we wear, etc). Hence, analyzing transformation, change, and revolution require more globally sight.

Therefore, in this paper, I will present the most recent revolution in the world, “Gerakan Reformasi” in Indonesia, to elaborate who play important role in this democratic transformation.
I am going to discuss the topic on four parts. Firstly, I will elaborate interdependence nature of the contemporary world to show how, in this interdependent world, any change in the other part of the world can change the rest of the world. Because my focus is to present the case (Indonesian case), I limit this theoretical discussion briefly. Secondly, I will elaborate the effect of monetary crisis in neighboring country to Indonesian; particularly its economic and sociopolitical condition that enabled the political change. Thirdly, I will describe why the both or either working and bourgeoisie classes did not play significant role in the revolution. Finally, I will analyze why student movement play are able to play the role supposedly played by working and bourgeoisie classes.

The Global Interdependence

According to Diamond, food production was ultimate factor of the divergence among people of the world. Food production enabled food storage, specialization, dense sedentary and stratified societies, and leaded to the three main approximate factors that has always been change the world: gun, germ, and steel.[4] I would argue further, following the argument he made, that it is also the case for the contemporary global interdependence.

In nomadic hunter-gatherer life, one relatively relied on himself or his small group (band). He experienced, as Diamond put it, egalitarian life.[5] Egalitarian life also implies independent life. Their simple lives required no more than food to eat. Interdependency to another people, if any, was not as significant as in the sedentary food-producing life. In the later, people life in a more structured society requiring its member to play a certain specialized role. Specialization implies job division among members of the society. In job division system, individual only produces certain product among other products he need to live; while the rest of his need, he obtains from others through barter and other forms of barter.

In Wallerstein’s world economy, job division extended beyond individual relation. In world economy, job division also included division among areas within the world system. Wallerstein proposes four different categories: core, semi-periphery, periphery, and external.[6] The categories describe each region's relative position within the world economy and their respective roles. Except the external areas, interdependency in the world economy, among core, periphery and semi-periphery areas of World System, where the core supply product and high skilled job to the periphery, while the periphery provide raw good and non skilled job for the core.
In the globally modern world, this job division and interdependency become more obvious. In recent days, a decision made by the Federal Bank in New York influences all part of the world. The political and security crisis in Iraq, one of the biggest oil suppliers in the world, influences world oil prices and then influence world economy in general. The change in one part of the world really influences other part of the world. Monetary crisis in 1997 East and Southeast Asia may be best explained on this context.

Crisis from the Neighbors

1996 Indonesia was one of the new tigers of Asia.[7] Its economy was almost perfect. The country achieved an average growth rate of 7.1 percent between 1985 and 1995, reduced its poverty rate from 60 percent of the population to 11 percent, and made an enormous overall improvement in general living standards. Indonesia was seen as a "model of development". and seemed well positioned for continued strong economic growth.[8]

That is why when in the mid of 1997, while monetary crisis hit Thailand, Korea, Philippine, and then Malaysia, Indonesian decision makers assured local market that monetary crisis would not hit Indonesia. They seem over confidence and miscalculated the interdependence nature of world economy and its domino effect. No more than a month, the “monetary Tsunami” hit Indonesia. Rupiah was falling rapidly, from Rp 2,300.00 per dollar to Rp 15,000.00 during the worst weeks.

The crisis soon revealed the underlying weakness of the Indonesian financial sector. The collapse of private sector trapped in foreign debt, the collapse of banking system, the most widespread effect of the economic crisis on the people of Indonesia has been accelerating inflation (from 6% in 1996 to 11% in 1997)[9], and finally the collapse of the overall Indonesian economic structure.

Since economics is the most important pillar of a state, the collapse of economic structure brought about the collapse of other structural pillar of society. Soon, political, social, and cultural structures of Indonesia follow the fate. Seemingly, now, the strong authoritarian regime of Soeharto, gripping the power for 30 years and would possibly continue for the at least five years later, could not stand strongly anymore to sustain those multidimensional turbulences. This gave the momentum for political change.

However, I believe that momentum and concussive structural conditioned arose from the monetary crisis will not bring about any change in political level without agent who play and use the momentum to make a change. Why? There was no political change in the neighboring countries without this agent of social change. The country with almost as authoritarian regime as Indonesian, Malaysia, did not witness such democratic transition. In addition, it confirms what Moore argued for the role of economical classes in social change.

In the next part I will describe how this economic crisis had opened the way for democratic transition in which student movement, not for the first time in the Indonesian history, played important role. However, it is better to begin with briefly description on some “fail” pro-democratic struggles before the crisis to account roles plaid by other groups, particularly the bourgeoisie and worker class.

Momentum for Democracy: Where were the Working and Bourgeoisie Classes?

Since the beginning of 1970s, attempts to resist the regime and to open space of democracy had been done. A tendency to be an authoritarian regime had been felt as the regime attempted to win unfairly the first election of 1971 through its pseudo-party of Golkar. Small and sporadic resistances erupted in the capital of Jakarta as well as in the remote far localities of Indonesia. [10] In Tanjung Priok (1984), triggered by religious abuse, thousand people led by local religious leader, attacked military office and burned stores owned by Indonesian Chinese. Settled by military fire and gun, hundreds people died in this riot.[11] In Nipah and Kedung Ombo, the peasants lead by local religious leaders resist dam project built on their land without their consent. In such and other cases, however, those social eruptions didn’t make any significance political change. Its local nature and limitation of the issue they posed made it impossible to be a greater movement for political change.

Let us now see the working class. During Soeharto administration, there was no freedom of union. There was only single union in almost in every single sector of economics and professional. There was only one union for the teacher (PGRI), one union for the journalist (PWI), and one union for the farmer. It was also the case for the worker. Worker union was limited by the government and only one was legally allowed, SPSI (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia or All Indonesian Worker Union). Often led by government poppet personality, SPSI necessarily was coopted by the regime.

Attempts to break the limitation were not absent. While Indonesian journalists, who deny to join the legally acknowledged union PWI, established AJI (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen or The alliance of Independent Journalist); some workers established an alternative union SBSI (Serikat Buruh Seluruh Indonesia: same English translation, but in Indonesian while “pekerja” is general word, “buruh” is for the underpaid worker).

Under surveillance and repression of the regime, however, it was difficult for SBSI to be a real alternative effective movement. Its members were not a high skill worker with high competitiveness in the market. The company, pressured by the government, could easily fire those who involve in such movement. Marsinah, not belong to SBSI but may be best example what to be put on stake if a worker organize other workers, had to paid with her life only to demand better wage.[12] Hence, few workers want to pay such an expensive cost for political good such as democracy; most prefer silence to dead. Demonstrations organized by SBSI, then, were only limited on issues related to worker interest: wage improvement and not democracy.
The Indonesian working class at that time was far from being like English working class described by Thompson. I would argue that while English Working class arose from a revolutionary change of society – marked by the shift from hand-mill to steam-powered mill[13] – that enable them to be revolutionary; the supposed Indonesian working class during Soeharto regime was born in the established industrial world, it is not revolutionary anymore in nature.
1990s worker did not experience revolutionary social change enabling them to achieve same level of ideological conscience required to be a “class” – as Wallerstein put it.[14] Lack of ideological consciousness, hence, caused the absence of idealized working class conceptualized by Marxists.

Another explanation that I would argue is the absent of space to consciously radicalize themselves: to learn or read inspiring Marxist work that has made working class in Europe consiounse of their class.[15] Soeharto regime, after the Communist coup de tat, banned any materials with Communist content. Therefore, ones who had access in foreign languages can not obtain the materials, let alone the poor and illiterate workers.

The Indonesian middle class, the bourgeoisie, on the other hand, were worst than the working class. According to Sulistyo, what might be called “middle class” in Indonesia is only “statistical middle class” rather than “sociological middle class”. They have a middle class income, but in fact they were “rent-seeker” who depended on the strong state.[16] They were not entrepreneur who based his business on their own talent and merit; rather they were doing business through nepotism or collusion with the regime and its cronies.

With such characters, the Indonesian middle class was, again, not a “class” in the term of Thompson’s class. Instead of being agent of social change, they were opportunist who would use their existing economical resources and capital to bribe whoever in power, shifting their dependency from established regime to the successive regime.

Without any group merit to be the classical Class, social change then will provide opportunity to any temporary grouping, across social class, such as interest group, religious community or student, to fill the space. In the later section, I will deal with student movement, the most prominent group in Indonesian political change.

The Student Movement: New Sociopolitical Class?
In the pre-independence Indonesia, student movement organized in the name of “Young Movement” lead the national movement.[17] In 1966, student movement enabled political change and power transition from Soekarno to Soeharto. And this very student movement obviously played significant role in the May 1998 Revolution.
Why does student movement play more significant role in Indonesia than other groups? As the one who once involved in the student movement, including the “fail” movement against Soeharto in the first half of 90s, I would argue that at least there are three characters inherent with student movement.

First is class consciousness. In the way that Thompson or Wallerstein emphasize the importance of this consciousness to be a class, students, thanks to their level of education and access to knowledge, have enough resources to persuade this required consciousness. Discussion among activist, contacts with intelligentsia, and working in the grass root activity and advocacy, are among other things that build the class consciousness among student. Since the first year of freshmen, students had been ensured by their senior (during orientation and inauguration days) that they have a par excellent social role, agent of social change, and they have to take side of oppressed, their fellow Indonesian.

Second is non partisan nature of their movement. It gave them legitimacy in the public level. The criticisms of partisan group, political as well as religious, fail to get public support because, what ever issue they pose, are deemed for the sake of their own political goal and interest. Criticisms comes from student movement, on the other hand, are believed as the voice of society, voice of truth because the student will not take any immediate advantage from the issue they blow up.

Third is the relative absent of economical constraint. In Indonesia, as long as youth is learning in the college, he/she commonly has full economical support from the family. It gave students time to train themselves and to use some of their time to work on an “expensive good” such as democracy – the good that working class would not do for its price in authoritarian regime.

While there are few studies on the student movement, we need deeper and more comprehensive studies on the issue. A study on a new class category, instead of working class or bourgeoisie class, is required as long as Indonesian democratic revolution is concerned. This paper, for its limitation, didn’t do so far and expected doing so in the next quarter.(*)

[1] Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1993, p. xxiii.
[2] For further account, see Eva-Lotta Hedman and John T. Sidel (eds.), Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century, London: Roudledge, 2000.
[3] For book well records the 1998 transition, see Hermawan Sulistyo, Lawan: Jejak-jejak Jalanan di Balik Kejatuhan Soeharto, Jakarta: Pensil-324, 2002
[4] Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.
[5] Ibid., p. 265-95, particularly the table 14.1 of p. 268-69.
[6] Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and The Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, San Diego: Academic Press. Inc., 1974.
[7] In those years, there were 7 countries considered as new tigers in Asia: Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
[8] CountryWatch.com, sources: IMF (www.imf.org) and CountryWire, downloaded from Yahoo Finance, http://biz.yahoo.com/ifc/id.html (accessed on December 9, 2005).
[9] See Stephen Sherlock, “Crisis in Indonesia: Economy, Society and Politics”, http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1997-98/98cib13.htm#INDO (accessed on December 9, 2005).
[10] For study on the movements during Soeharto administration and their failure, see Arief Budiman and Olle Törnquist (eds.), Aktor Demokrasi, Jakarta: ISAI, 2001.
[11] ELSAM, “Kasus-kasus Pelanggaran Berat HAM”, http://www.elsam.or.id/kkr/tanjung%20%20priok.html (accessed on December, 9 2005).
[12] Account on her murder can be read in the writing of Benjamin Waters, “Marsinah Murder”, in http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/southeastasia/indonesia/publications/doss1/marsinah.htm (accessed on December 9 2005).
[13] EP Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, New York: Ventage Book, 1963, pp 189-190.
[14] According to Thompson, it was “… the consciousness of an identity of interests as between all these diverse groups of working people and as against the interests of other classes”. Ibid., p. 194; while Walerstein argued, “Class always exist potentitally (an sich). The issue is under which condition they become class-conscious (für sich), … operate as a group in the politico-economic arenas …” Wallerstein, The Modern World System, p. 351.
[15] Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, p. 118.
[16] Hermawan Sulistyo, Lawan…, p. 49.
[17] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London & NY: Verso, 1991; where he deal with what “youth” meant in the pre-independence Indonesia.